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A f g h a n i s t a n
C O N R A D S C H E T T E R
After the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Chech-
nya, the war in Afghanistan is being explained in
terms of the supremacy of ethnicity. The solution,
the UN is aspiring, seems plausible: if representa-
tives of all ethnic groups can be brought together
into one government, the 23-year war in Afghanistan
will end. But such a solution bears the danger that by
linking political office and ethnicity the conflict in
Afghanistan will be stabilized and even intensified.
M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
E t h n i c i t y
in the Afghan Conflict
Policy-makers and the media tend to narrow
the conflict in Afghanistan to the ethnic di-
mension. They hold that a government in
which all ethnic groups are represented
would reflect all facets of the Afghan popu-
lation. They often make the mistake of see-
ing ethnic groups as uniform bodies acting
in accord and equating the ethnic groups
with the political movements. What is ig-
nored in the present debate is the fact that,
despite the ethnicization of the war, the eth-
nicization of the Afghan masses failed. Most
Afghans hate all the parties to the conflict
equally. Nor is the problem of ethnicity of
much significance to them. Largely forgot-
ten is that, to the Afghans, it is not the ethnic
group, but rather family, clan and village
which provide the major hallmarks of action
and identity. Even the relevance of ethnicity
as a factor of military and political cohesion
remained limited in the Afghan war: count-
less commanders and combat units changed
their allegiance several times out of political
opportunism and economic incentive Ð in-
dependent of their ethnic affiliation.
What is an ethnic group?
The dilemma with raising ethnicity to the
basis of conflict-resolution begins with the
question of what constitutes an ethnic
group. Despite the widely held view that
ethnic groups have existed since time im-
memorial, most of those in Afghanistan
were 'created' in the course of the 20t h c e n-
tury. Driven by the scientific endeavour to
classify people according to cultural cus-
toms, ethnologists invented an entire series
of ethnic groups: Nuristani, Pashai, Aimaq,
Tajik or Farsiwan. The segments of the pop-
ulace for whom they were invented are
often not even familiar with such labels,
much less aware of any common identity. In
addition there is a lack of viable criteria to
determine who is Uzbek, Hazara or Pashtun.
For example, those who maintain that Pash-
tuns speak Pashtu and are Sunni Muslims
err, since there are also Shiite Pashtuns in
the Qandahar region and Pashtuns from
Kabul often do not speak a word of Pashtu.
A good example for the aforementioned is
the former king, Zahir Shah. The difficulties
with differentiating are being aggravated
by the fact that many Afghans Ð if they mas-
ter the cultural patterns Ð in different situa-
tions claim to be of different ethnicity. The
former Afghan president Babrak Karmal
used to emphasize his Pashtun origin,
whereas many Afghans considered him to
be a Tajik or an immigrated Kashmiri. Ismail
Khan, one of the most important comman-
ders of the Northern Alliance, is sometimes
considered to be a Tadjik, a Pashtun or a Far-
siwan. He himself steadily refuses to be as-
signed to a certain ethnic group.
Because of differing scientific approaches,
it is unclear just how many ethnic groups
exist in Afghanistan and how large they ac-
tually are. A German survey concludes there
are about 50,1 while a Russian study claims
there are 200.2 Also it is impossible to say
how many Pashtuns or Tajiks are living in
Afghanistan. Thus emerges the problem of
which ethnic groups are to be taken (and to
what extent) into consideration in an 'ethni-
cal solution', as promoted by the UN.
Nation building of
A f g h a n i s t a n
The question of why ethnic groups rose to
political relevance in Afghanistan comes to
mind. To answer this question one has to
look back into history. The Afghan state was
created by the rivalling colonial powers, Eng-
land and Russia, at the end of the 19t h c e n t u-
ry. The ruling family of the Pashtuns, en-
throned by England, favoured Pashtun ele-
ments in their concept of the nation-state.
That is why 'Afghan' is the Persian synonym
for Pashtun, Pashtu was always the Afghan
national language, and the Afghan history
was written from a Pashtun point of view.
The politics of the ruling family employed the
ethnic patterns that came into existence in
order to regulate access to public goods and
offices. Pashtuns were privileged in all areas
and dominated the military. Tajiks were left
with the economic sector and the education-
al institutions, whereas the Hazara were mar-
ginalized. The differential treatment of peo-
ple went along with the forming of ethnic
stereotypes: Pashtuns were considered 'belli-
cose', Tajiks were said to be 'thrifty', Uzbeks
were known as 'brutal' and the Hazara as 'illit-
erate' and 'poor'. Despite the politics of the
nation-state having created an ethnic hierar-
chy, there were surprisingly few ethnic con-
flicts. The main reason for this was the enor-
mous contrast between the rural and urban
areas. Politics in Kabul was of little interest to
the people in rural Afghanistan. Afghans saw
the nation-state as a hostile factor and not as
a key to accessing resources (such as offices
or land rights) which they should take control
of. Accordingly they did not articulate a polit-
ical will to overcome the ethnic hierarchy
stipulated by the state.
Ethnicity in the war
Ethnicity became a political-military force
to reckon with when the Afghan war broke
out in 1979. Even though the war was domi-
nated by the antagonism of communism vs.
Islam regarding the paradigms of the Cold
War, the belligerent parties increasingly en-
hanced the ethnic momentum to strength-
en their positions. The communist rulers
hoped to bring certain ethnic groups closer
by raising them to the status of nationalities.
Even more important was the creation of
militias that relied on ethnic affiliation; well
known is the Uzbek militia of Rashid Dos-
tum. Also Pakistan and Iran used the ethnic
potential for conflicts. On the grounds of
Shiite loyalties, Iran established the Hizb-i
wahdat, which was strong among the Shiite
Hazara. During the 1980s the Jamiat-i islami,
the oldest resistance movement, developed
into a representation for the Tajiks. Pakistan
supported the Taliban, which followed a rad-
ical Islam but was also Pashtun dominated.
But the ethnicization of the conflict was re-
stricted with regard to one important aspect:
the ethnic card was never played openly, but
remained covert. Thus one can find very little
proof of ethnocentrism among any of the po-
litical movements involved. The published
speeches of leaders such as Ahmad Shah
Massud, Burhanuddin Rabbani or Mullah
Omar, are imbued with Islamic rhetoric, but
all of them vehemently denied any ethnic di-
mension of the war. Politicians never tire of
declaring their respective parties as being
multi-ethnic. The underlying reason is that
Afghans refrain from picking ethnicity out as
a central theme. There is a wide-ranging con-
sensus among Afghans that to bring forward
arguments along ethnic lines will threaten
the continued existence of the Afghan na-
tion-state. Whoever claims rights in the name
of an ethnic group is quickly considered a
traitor. In addition to this, many Afghans con-
sider the accentuation of ethnicity as un-Is-
lamic, as it questions the u m m a, the all-inclu-
sive Islamic community.
Prospects for the future
If an attempt is being made to implement
the UN-sponsored 'ethnical solution', the
explosiveness of this proposal will become
evident, for it can only be achieved through
a quota approach. Recently, Pakistani Presi-
dent Musharaf called for the Pashtuns to
hold 60% of the offices in a future Afghan
government. But setting quotas for govern-
ment posts harbours the danger of perma-
nently fixing the importance of ethnicity,
thus setting the stage for a juggling of num-
bers at the filling of every official position.
The lessons from Sri Lanka and Malaysia
should have taught that setting ethnic quo-
tas is not a suitable formula for settling an
'ethnic' conflict, partly because it prepares
the ground for the kind of patronage that is
diametrically opposed to the concepts of a
civil society propagated by the West.
There has been much discussion of estab-
lishing an ethnic federalism as a way of doing
justice to ethnic demands. But that ap-
proach, too, would prove counterproductive,
since Afghanistan is not ethnically homoge-
nous and the various population groups are
very difficult to delineate geographically.
Often enough there are villages in which a
whole range of ethnic groups reside. The im-
plementation of federalism would also har-
bour the danger of 'ethnic cleansing', since
ideas of homogenization could easily be pro-
jected onto the territory as highlighted by
the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Against
this background the suggestion to separate
Afghanistan into a northern Tajik zone and a
southern Pashtun one, does not only seem
nave but highly dangerous.3
Also the raising of ethnic representation
will have dire consequences. In that case
ethnicity could not be neglected in the polit-
ical context and would turn into the bedrock
of all political action. The still minor impor-
tance that ethnicity has among the Afghan
populace should be harnessed for political
reconstruction, rather than being enforced
by an 'ethnical solution'. Any new regime
must underline that government appoint-
ments and political decisions will be guided
by professional competence and not by eth-
nic considerations. A new Afghan constitu-
tion should likewise keep clear of ethnic fac-
tors as much as possible. It would be devas-
tating to establish Sunni Islam as the state
religion, for that would shut the Shiites out.
As to language policy, Farsi Ð Afghanistan's
lingua franca Ð and Pashtu should be given
coequal status, while such languages as
Uzbeki, Turkmeni or Baluchi could be grant-
ed the status of province languages.
In Afghanistan, the international commu-
nity is once again faced with the challenge
of dealing with a conflict that is interpreted
as an ethnic one. The architects of a future
Afghanistan would be well advised to work
against the ethnic polarization of the coun-
try. Ethnicity is not the cause of the conflict,
but the consequence of political and mili-
tary mobilization. Hence acceding to ethnic
demands will not contribute toward the res-
olution of conflict, but will only strengthen
those who Ð as has happened before in the
Balkans Ð use ethnicity as an instrument for
promoting their own interests. 
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